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Mexico has become a much more open econ-
omy over the past 20 years. And since the 1994
financial crisis, Mexican authorities have shown a
commitment to macroeconomic discipline.
Given this progress, many observers are
enthusiastic about the country’s prospects. Some,
in fact, wonder whether Mexico is about to take
off and become the world’s next economic tiger.
The evidence suggests, however, that much work
remains to be done before Mexico can catch up 
to First World nations the way countries such as
Singapore and South Korea did in the last few
decades.
Until the early 1980s, like most developing
nations, Mexico sharply restricted foreign invest-
ment and trade in hopes of expanding domestic
production capacity. But a severe financial crisis in
1982 prompted a change of tactics. Foreign invest-
ment limits were lifted in 1983 in some sectors. In
1985, Mexico announced it would join the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and did so the fol-
lowing year. Between 1985 and 1990, the country’s
maximum tariff fell from 100 percent to 20 per-
cent. Most sectors were opened to foreign invest-
ment in 1989, paving the way for a successful
wave of privatizations. By 1994, 80 percent of
In the late 1980s, the number of people receiving welfare benefits in
America began to rise. As the trend continued into the 1990s, a bipartisan coali-
tion searched for ways to reform the American welfare system. Convinced
that many welfare recipients could work if presented with appropriate incen-
tives, political leaders devised a welfare reform bill that was intended to pro-
mote self-sufficiency while retaining a social safety net for those who tem-
porarily have no other options.
The bill was intensely controversial. An influential policy adviser said the
bill would inflict “serious injury to American children.”
1 A senator who special-
izes in welfare issues said there was “absolutely no evidence that this radical
idea has even the slightest chance of success.”
2 And the Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities predicted that the most significant effect of welfare
reform would be “a large increase in poverty.”
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Over these objections, President
Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) into law in August 1996. And
in the years following passage of the law,
welfare recipiency has declined signifi-
cantly—without a corresponding increase
in the poverty rate. Many observers now
cite welfare reform as one of the most
successful policy experiments in a gener-
ation. In the words of President Clinton,
the welfare system has become “a sec-
ond chance” instead of “a way of life.”
Because PRWORA expires on Sept.
30 unless renewed by Congress, it is an
opportune time to examine the law’s
effects and draw lessons for its future.
This article looks at the structure of the
law, details its results and discusses what
is likely to happen later this year when
the law is reauthorized.
What Did the Welfare Reform
Law Do?
The welfare reform law focused on
the Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) program, which was the
cash-grant portion of America’s social
safety net. (The box “A Brief Description
of the U.S. Welfare System” describes the
other portions of the safety net.) The law
replaced AFDC with a program called
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF) and made four major changes to
the welfare system.
The first—and perhaps most signifi-
cant—change was a requirement that
recipients work in exchange for their
cash benefits. Previously, recipients were
required to make only a minimal effort at
finding employment. Under the new sys-
tem, many of those who received bene-
fits for more than two years lose their
cash grant unless they perform a work-
related activity for at least 30 hours per
week. Private employment is one way to
fulfill the requirement, but education or
training can generally also be counted as
work for purposes of this legislation.
Second, the law imposed a five-year
lifetime limit on the amount of time any
single family can receive cash benefits.
Previously, it was possible to spend a
lifetime on the welfare rolls, which led
many analysts—and more than a few
welfare recipients—to conclude that
welfare created a “cycle of poverty” from
which welfare families could never
escape. Under the new system, all but
the most hardship-stricken recipients are
permanently barred from cash grants
after five years even if the recipient re-
mains outside the workforce. The idea
was akin to FDR’s vow that the welfare
system would provide a temporary “hand
up” rather than a permanent “handout.”
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A Brief Description of the U.S. Welfare System
In the United States, many federal programs are available to help the poor, including programs to
provide home heating oil, housing subsidies and even infant formula. But for our purposes, the U.S.
welfare system consists of three major components: Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF),
food stamps and Medicaid. (A fourth program, Supplemental Security Income or SSI, provides signifi-
cant support to the elderly and disabled but is not considered here.) 
The programs differ in three respects: funding source, benefit type and scope of coverage. TANF
(formerly known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children) gives cash benefits to poor families with
children and is jointly funded by states and the federal government. The Food Stamp Program gives food
vouchers to low-income individuals—including TANF recipients but also including many single workers
with low-paying or seasonal work—and is funded by the federal government. Finally, Medicaid provides
medical care to poor and near-poor individuals and is largely funded by the federal government, with
some help from the states.
Many people believe that welfare is one of the largest areas of government spending, but the extent
to which this is true depends on the definition of welfare. Cash grants through the TANF program
amounted to $18 billion in 2001, slightly less than 1 percent of the federal budget. Food stamps took up
an additional $19 billion (1 percent) of the federal budget, and Medicaid consumed $129 billion (7 per-
cent) of the budget. Summed together, these programs are about half as large as the defense budget.
Many observers now
cite welfare reform 
as one of the most
successful policy
experiments in a
generation.the predictions of even welfare reform’s
most ardent advocates. The current wel-
fare participation rate, a 35-year low,
returns welfare recipiency to where it
stood at the dawn of Lyndon Johnson’s
Great Society (Chart 1).
During the post-welfare-reform
period, recipiency declined in all 50
states (Chart 2). The largest reduction
(92 percent) occurred in Wyoming,
which now has fewer than 1,000 recipi-
ents. Several large states also experi-
enced significant success in cutting their
Third, the law made it more difficult
for noncitizens to receive cash benefits
or food stamps. Previously, noncitizens
who were legal permanent residents of
the United States could access most of
the safety net available to citizens, which
led some observers to conclude that
there was an incentive for impoverished
residents of other countries to enter the
United States and become welfare recip-
ients. To guard against this possibility,
the welfare reform law barred many
noncitizens from either cash grants or
food stamps, although these restrictions
were later relaxed for some of those
affected.
Finally, the law removed the cash-
grant portion of the welfare system from
the list of entitlement programs. Previ-
ously, anyone who met certain eligibility
criteria had a legally enforceable right to
cash benefits, regardless of the fiscal cir-
cumstances of states or the federal gov-
ernment, the number of people on the
welfare rolls or how hard recipients tried
to find alternative means of supporting
themselves. Under welfare reform, indi-
viduals no longer have an automatic right
to cash benefits simply because they are
poor or have children.
4
Did Welfare Reform Reduce 
the Welfare Rolls?
In the five years following passage
of the welfare reform law, the number 
of individuals receiving cash grants de-
clined by 56.5 percent, a result beyond
welfare rolls, such as the 78 percent de-
cline in Florida and the 72 percent decline
in Illinois. The smallest reductions oc-
curred in Indiana and Rhode Island,
whose welfare rolls declined by 22 per-
cent and 29 percent, respectively. Texas
welfare rolls declined by 49 percent.
It may seem natural to credit the
1990s economic boom rather than wel-
fare reform for this decline. But while
the strong economy surely played a role,
there are two reasons to think welfare
reform was also important. First, the
number of welfare recipients did not fall
in other postwar economic expansions.
Second, the number of people partici-
pating in other welfare programs did not
fall by as much as cash-grant recipiency
fell in the 1990s; food stamp recipiency
fell by only half that amount, and Med-
icaid recipiency actually rose during the
1990s (Chart 3). This evidence suggests
welfare reform was a significant contrib-
utor to the declines, a finding confirmed
by a recent Council of Economic Advis-
ers report.
5
By itself, however, the reduction in
welfare recipiency does not make wel-
fare reform a successful policy experi-
ment. Opponents of reform had made
serious charges about how welfare
reform “punishes the poor.” If welfare
reform slashed the amount states could
spend on each recipient, if those who
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Welfare Rolls Decline Dramatically
Recipients (in millions) Percent of U.S. population
Chart 1




















Decline in AFDC/TANF Recipients, Fiscal Years 1996–2001
Chart 2




–92.4 to –74.8left the welfare rolls were continually
rebuffed in their job searches or if the
poverty rate surged to new heights, the
sharp welfare-roll reductions might be
viewed as exacting a high social cost. On
the other hand, if these outcomes did
not occur, welfare reform might instead
be viewed as one of the most successful
policy changes of the 1990s.
On the spending side, per-capita out-
lays doubled between 1996 and 2001
(Chart 4) as recipiency plunged.
6 On the
employment side, the General Account-
ing Office found that a majority of for-
mer welfare recipients have entered the
labor force and continue to work today.
7
And the poverty rate for all races fell
from 13.7 percent in 1996 to 11.3 percent
in 2000 (the last year for which data are
available) (Chart 5). Of special signifi-
cance is the fact that the largest decline
in the poverty rate during this period
occurred among blacks, who form a dis-
proportionately large share of the wel-
fare rolls and were expected to have the
most difficult time adapting to welfare
reform. Taken together, the data suggest
welfare reform proceeded in exactly the
way President Clinton predicted when
he signed the law: It encouraged many
families to work without throwing many
families into poverty.
Is There Anything Left to Reform?
Since the welfare rolls have already
fallen by more than half over the past
five years, it is inevitable that further
reductions due to welfare reform will
eventually slow. It appears this may be
happening now: Cash-grant recipiency
remained constant in the fourth quarter
of 2001, and anecdotal evidence sug-
gests it may have risen slightly in the first
half of 2002. Absent further welfare re-
form, and especially at a time of eco-
nomic weakness, the heady days of hun-
dreds of thousands of new workers
entering the labor force may be over.
At first glance, the legal changes
wrought by the welfare reform law
appear so sweeping that it is difficult to
imagine what could be left to reform.
Indeed, there is little doubt that the 1996
welfare reform law represents the most
substantial reworking of America’s social
safety net since the 1960s. Welfare recip-
ients must work. Welfare recipients must
exit the rolls after five years. Many non-
citizens cannot receive welfare benefits.
No one is legally entitled to cash from
the welfare system. However, a closer
look at the provisions of the welfare
reform law reveals broad exceptions to
each of these stipulations, making the
law less sweeping than it appears.
Recipients do face a five-year life-
time limit on welfare recipiency—but
each state may exempt up to one-fifth of
its welfare recipients from the ban if the
state decrees those recipients to be hard-
ship cases. Recipients no longer have an
entitlement to cash assistance—but they
continue to have an automatic right to
food stamps and Medicaid, which form
the majority of benefits for the typical
recipient. And many legal residents are
disqualified from receiving benefits—
but not if they become U.S. citizens.
The work-requirement rule has the
broadest set of exceptions. First, recipi-
ents are able to spend two years on the
welfare rolls before they must work. Sec-
ond, states may exempt up to half their
welfare recipients from the rule. Third,
states may calculate the maximum num-
ber of exemptions using either their cur-
rent caseloads or their 1995 caseloads,
which in practice allows some states to
exempt almost every welfare recipient
from the rule. Fourth, states may shift
some of their welfare funds into a social
services block grant, which can be given
to recipients who do not meet work
requirements. Finally, since states may
define work to include many forms of
education and training, even those recip-
ients covered by the work-requirement
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AFDC/TANF Shows Biggest Drop
















SOURCES: The Administration for Children and Families;
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; USDA.









’01 ’99 ’97 ’95 ’93 ’91 ’89 ’87
SOURCE: The Administration for Children and Families.
Poverty Rates Decline for All Races
Percent below poverty level
Chart 5














’00 ’99 ’98 ’97 ’96 ’95 ’94 ’93 ’92 ’91 ’90 ’89 ’88 ’87 ’86 ’85 ’84 ’83 ’82 ’81 ’80 ’79 ’78 ’77 ’76 ’75 ’74 ’73rule need not work at anything resem-
bling a private sector job to receive their
cash grant.
Giving states discretion over these
issues is not a problem in itself. Indeed,
one of the greatest features of American
democracy is that states act as laborato-
ries of democracy, and many states have
developed innovative ways to reach the
targets set by the welfare reform law.
However, since the amount of federal
funding each state receives is partially
determined by the extent to which it
meets the welfare reform law’s targets,
states have a strong incentive to give
numerous exemptions from the law’s
work requirements rather than encour-
aging recipients to work.
Some states, such as Wisconsin, have
adopted innovative programs to encour-
age work. Others, such as Massachusetts
—where only 9 percent of welfare recip-
ients worked in 2001—have not. Statisti-
cal evidence indicates that welfare re-
cipiency declined most sharply in states
that strictly enforced the law’s work re-
quirements, which suggests that stricter
limits on the use of exemptions would
further reduce welfare recipiency. The
question policymakers must now answer
is whether states that do not wish to
strictly enforce the law’s provisions
should be required (or encouraged) to
do so.
What Happens Now?
Congress faces three possibilities for
welfare reform. First, the welfare reform
law could be strengthened to further
reduce welfare recipiency, as discussed
above. Second, the welfare reform ex-
periment could be ended entirely and
the system could return to the pre-1997
world in which needy families automati-
cally receive benefits without federally
imposed time limits or work require-
ments. Third, welfare reform could be
retained as it currently stands, cementing
the gains of the past five years without
attempting to further reduce welfare re-
cipiency.
In February 2002, President Bush
released a welfare reform proposal that
largely maintains the provisions of the
1996 law. Work requirements and time
limits would remain, as would the re-
strictions on noncitizen recipiency and
the non-entitlement status of cash welfare
grants. Food stamps and medical care
would remain entitlements, and funding
would be maintained at current levels.
States would retain much of the flexibil-
ity they currently possess.
However, the Bush plan would alter
the 1996 law in at least two important
ways. The first and most controversial is
a proposal to implement stricter work
requirements. States could exempt only
30 percent of their current caseloads
(rather than 50 percent of their 1995
caseloads) from the work requirement.
Also, the minimum hours a recipient
must work would rise from 30 to 40,
with 24 of those hours spent in a private
sector or public sector job, and states
would have less flexibility to define work.
These changes would almost certainly
reduce the welfare rolls still further,
though with a weaker economy and a
much smaller pool of welfare recipients,
any further reductions would almost cer-
tainly not be as large as those achieved
under the 1996 law.
The other main change from current
law in the Bush plan is an effort to
address the controversial issue of mar-
riage. The welfare system currently pro-
vides a fiscal incentive to remain single
because recipients can lose their benefits
if they marry. To be sure, individuals
base their matrimonial decisions on
many factors other than the welfare sys-
tem, so any marriage-related measures 
in the welfare reform law would be
unlikely to have a very large effect on
marriage rates. Still, while it seems clear
that government should not compel any-
one to marry, many observers believe it
is appropriate for government to offset
any unintentional bias the welfare sys-
tem creates against marriage. As a first
step, the Bush plan would allocate $300
million for as-yet-unspecified pilot pro-
grams to encourage marriage among wel-
fare recipients.
At the time of this writing, the House
has essentially approved the Bush pro-
posal, while a Senate committee has
approved something very close to the
1996 welfare reform law. The final ver-
sion will likely fall somewhere in be-
tween, though a one-year extension of
the 1996 law may be necessary while
negotiators work out the details. Con-
gress’ action suggests that the broad pol-
icy prescription for the welfare system
has been determined—the dramatic
changes wrought by the 1996 law will
continue in the years to come. What
remains to be seen is how much further
the 2002 law will go in reforming the
welfare system—and reducing the wel-
fare rolls.
—Jason L. Saving
Saving is a senior economist in the Research
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas.
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